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Abstract
The recent years have exhibited a burst in the amount of collaborative activities
among rms selling complementary products. This paper aims at providing a rationale
for such a large extent of collaboration ties among complementors. To this end, we
analyze a game in which the two producers of a certain component have the possibility
to form pairwise collaboration ties with each of the two producers of a complemen-
tary component. Once ties are formed, each of the four rms decides how much to
invest in improving the quality of the match with each possible complementor, under
the assumption that collaborating with a complementor makes it cheaper to invest
in enhancing match quality with such complementor. Once investment choices have
taken place, all rms choose prices for their respective components. Our main nding
in this setting is that rms end up forming as many collaboration ties as it is possible,
although they would all prefer a scenario where collaboration were forbidden, unlike a
social planner.
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1 Introduction
The recent decades have witnessed a shift in the competitive paradigm in high-tech industries
that is driven to a large extent by the increasing importance of product complementarity. In-
deed, cooperation among rms selling complementary products is playing a prominent role
in industries such as consumer electronics, semiconductors or telecommunications. More
generally, hardware-software industries have exhibited a surge in the extent of cooperation
among producers of complementary goods with the aim of improving the interoperability of
their respective products (see e.g. Moore 1996, Gawer and Cusumano 2002, Adner 2006,
Adner and Kapoor 2010, Gawer and Henderson 2007).1 Building such innovation ecosystems
(Adner 2006) with the producers of complementary goods seems to be the key competitive
weapon in most high-tech industries, in which the notion of competition has been displaced
by that of co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebu¤ 1996). A noteworthy feature of collab-
oration with complementors (i.e., rms selling products that complement each other from
the point of view of consumers) is that it is not unusual for rms to collaborate with several
complementors that sell substitutes of each other.2
A natural question that arises in these settings is whether such extensive collaboration
is desirable from the standpoints of rms and consumers. Intuitively, one would be tempted
to think that collaboration in improving the interoperability of complementary products is
e¢ cient both for the rms involved, and in fact for society as a whole. The purpose of this
paper is to show that this intuition may be valid for society, but not for the rms involved,
which may be trapped in a prisonners dilemma. Collaboration may then result in equilibria
in which rms are worse o¤ than when rms do not collaborate with complementors. This
holds regardless of whether collaboration ties are exclusive or not, under the assumption
that collaborating with a complementor makes it easier to enhance interoperability with
such complementor.
To formally analyze these issues, we consider a game played by two rms X1 and X2
that sell components that (perfectly) complement those sold by rms Y1 and Y2 (both of
which are also engaged in the game). In this mix-and-match setting (Matutes and Regibeau
1988 and Economides 1989), there are four systems that are contemplated by consumers
1The interoperability of the components of which a composite good consists refers to their coherence to
work together with each other as a sole system. This is largely related to the absence of conicts arising
from possible incompatibility issues.
2To give concrete examples, mobile phone manufacturer Nokia allied rst with Intel to develop the MeeGo
operating system for smartphones, and later signed an agreement with Microsoft to support the Windows
Phone operating system. In addition, the Intel Architecture Lab (IAL) was formed to foster investment
in components complementary to Intels microprocessors by rms that many times competed against each
other.
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when they make their purchase decisions: X1Y1, X1Y2, X2Y1 and X2Y2. The game that
we study consists of three stages. In the rst stage, each rm decides whether to form a
(pairwise) collaboration link with each of its possible complementors (collaboration among
rms selling substitute components of a system is not allowed). In the second stage, each
rm decides how much to invest in improving the interoperability of its component with each
of its complementors.3 It is assumed that a rm that has formed a collaboration link with
a complementor faces lower costs when enhancing interoperability with such complementor.
In the third and nal stage, each rm decides independently on the price of its component,
given past interoperability investments of all the rms involved in the game.
We nd in this setting that the (unique) equilibrium collaboration network involves each
rm forming (pairwise) collaboration links with its two complementors. If collaboration ties
can be formed only in an exclusive manner, then exactly the same forces (subject to the
exclusivity restriction) imply that in equilibrium each rm forms a collaboration link with
just one of its complementors. In both the exclusive and non-exclusive settings, equilibria
exhibit all rms collaborating with at least one complementor, which seems to accord well
with the empirical evidence on innovation ecosystems.
These equilibrium outcomes seem quite intuitive, but it is worth noting that intuition
may conceal the e¤ect of several forces working at the same time. Thus, two complementors
that form a new collaboration link between them benet from cost sinergies and increase
their investments in enhancing the interoperability with each other. This e¤ect conforms to
the intuition that one may have on the impact of a new collaboration link. However, two
rms that form a new collaboration tie with each other must also bear in mind that the
rms not involved in such a tie will strategically react. This strategic e¤ect of collaboration
turns out to be positive, and hence reinforces the e¤ect of the cost synergy that arises when
two rms start collaborating. Collaboration has a strategic e¤ect in that the rms not
involved in the new collaboration tie reduce their investments in each other as well as in the
complementor involved in the new collaboration tie. From the viewpoint of the rms that
start collaborating, the latter reduction in interoperability investments is harmful, but its
impact is lower than the former reduction, which is benecial, hence the positive strategic
e¤ect of collaboration. Factoring all the incentives, we have that it is always desirable to
form a new collaboration tie with a complementor with which a rm does not have one. This
rat race ends when no more ties are possible, and hence each rm collaborates with as many
complementors as it can.
3Greater investment in the interoperability of two components is modeled as an enhancement in the
(perceived) quality of the system comprising both components (e.g., the investment by X1 in improving
interoperability with component Y2 is specic to Y2, and has no e¤ect on the interoperability of components
X1 and Y1).
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Although a rm would benet from its competitor committing not to collaborate with
any complementor, it holds that all the rms would be better o¤ if each could make such
commitment. Hence, the equilibrium outcome exhibits the features of a prisonners dilemma
despite all rms are more productive in enhancing interoperability between complementary
components. Being more productive, each rm invests more in interoperability than in the
absence of any collaboration amongst complementors. The greater investment leads to higher
investment costs, incurred with the aim of vertically di¤erentiating the systems in which a
rm participates. Because all other rms act in the same way, rms boost investments but
do not manage to vertically di¤erentiate any system, and hence they attain the same prot
in the product market as in the absence of collaboration. This growth in investment costs
without greater product market prots explains why the equilibrium outcome is ine¢ cient
for rms. As for consumers, all of them benet in equilibrium from the better functionality
of every system relative to when rms do not collaborate. This explains why collaboration
arising as an equilibrium outcome enhances social welfare relative to the situation in which
rms do not collaborate with complementors.
Our result that collaboration in R&D among complementors results in private ine¢ -
ciencies is in stark contrast with the result that R&D collaboration among rms selling
substitute goods may be desirable both for rms and society, as shown in the seminal papers
by DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). These papers
do not consider whether a rm has incentives to collaborate with other rms, a limitation
that has been overcome by subsequent work by Bloch (1995) using a coalitions approach,
and more recently by Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) using a bilateral link formation
approach.4 Both of these papers show that excessive collaboration may arise in equilibrium.
Although we also contend that equilibria displaying collaboration may be ine¢ cient, it is
worth noting that the results in Bloch (1995) and Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) are
derived for substitute goods, not for complementary goods, as is our focus.
Our paper also contributes to the literature analyzing strategic competition when there
exists at least one complementor whose pricing activities interact with those of two rms
selling components that constitute substitutes for each other. This literature was pioneered
by Economides and Salop (1992) as an extension of early work by Cournot (1838), who
analyzed the e¤ect of a merger of two monopolists that produce complementary goods.
The paper by Economides and Salop (1992) examines the e¤ect of cooperation in prices
4See Leahy and Neary (1997) for a generalization of the models in DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). See also Bloch (2005) for a comprehensive survey that covers strategic
network formation games in settings with R&D activities. Finally, it is worth pointing out that Westbrock
(2010) builds on Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003) so as to analyze how
asymmetric R&D networks may be socially e¢ cient if collaboration ties are somewhat costly to establish.
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(i.e., a merger) between the two existing producers of one of the two components of which a
system consists. They consider two scenarios, depending on whether or not the two producers
of the complementary component are already cooperating in prices. In our work, we do not
analyze price cooperation and, in fact, rms always choose prices noncooperatively regardless
of the structure of the collaboration network. The network architecture does have an e¤ect
on cooperation in R&D activities, though.5 Our paper is also related to recent work by
Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebu¤ and Yo¢ e (2008). Their paper provides conditions under
which a rmmay benet from having a new competitor enter with a substitute good whenever
there exists a complementor for both the rm under consideration and its new competitor.
Our framework di¤ers in that it does not focus on the e¤ects of entry on co-opetive settings,
as they do, but rather it examines the incentives to form collaboration links and to invest in
enhancing interoperability among complementors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game we
consider. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ ciency properties of the unique equilibrium of the
game depending on whether or not collaboration is exclusive. Section 4 shows that results are
robust to changes in the solution concept and the implications of collaboration ties. Section
5 deals with concluding remarks.
2 The model
We dene a system as a pair of perfectly complementary goods such as hardware and software.
The two perfect complements giving rise to a system are called components X and Y . It is
assumed that there are two rms costlessly producing component X, X1 and X2, and two
rms costlessly producing component Y , Y1 and Y2.6 As a result, there are n = 4 systems:
X1Y1, X1Y2, X2Y1 and X2Y2. System XiYj (i; j = 1; 2) can be bought by any consumer at
price pi;j = pXi + pYj , where pXi and pYj respectively denote the prices at which components
Xi and Yj are sold. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will write pij instead of pi;j
for system XiYj. Also, rms X1 and X2 are typically referred to as the complementors of
rms Y1 and Y2, and vice versa.
It is assumed that there exists a unit mass of consumers willing to buy at most one
system. System XiYj is assumed to create a gross utility of vi;j to any consumer (again,
5There is a recent literature on (pure and mixed) bundling by rms that produce two perfectly comple-
mentary components in competition with rms that produce just one of these components (see e.g. Denicolò
2000 and Choi 2008). The reason why this stream of research building on Economides and Salop (1992)
is not related to our work is that we do not consider bundling, an issue that certainly deserves a separate
analysis beyond the scope of our paper.
6That production is costless is without loss of generality if the marginal cost of production is constant
and the xed costs of operation are not too large.
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we will typically write vij instead of vi;j). The gross utility vij is largely the outcome of
choices by rms Xi and Yj. More specically, for some given scalar v > 0, we have that
vij = v + x
j
i + y
i
j, where x
j
i is rm Xis R&D investment in improving the quality of the
match with rm Yjs component and yij is rm Yjs R&D investment in improving the quality
of the match with rm Xis component.7 Thus, the investment variables x
j
i and y
i
j a¤ect
the vertical attributes of system XiYj. Given their system-specicity, they can be viewed
as investments in improving the interoperability of components Xi and Yj, although other
interpretations are possible and may be more appealing depending on the context.
Besides (possibly) being vertically di¤erentiated, systems are perceived by consumers as
being horizontally di¤erentiated in an exogenous manner. To model consumer preferences
over horizontally di¤erentiated systems, we follow Chen and Riordan (2007) in using their
"spokes" model of nonlocalized di¤erentiation. Thus, each of the N = 4 systems desired
by consumers is represented by a point at the origin of a line of length 1=2, a line which
is denoted by lXiYj for system XiYj (i; j = 1; 2). The other end of a line is called its
terminal, and it is assumed that the terminals of all lines meet at a point called the center
(see Figure 1). All the existing consumers are uniformly distributed along the four lines. A
consumer who is located on line lXiYj at distance dXiYj 2 [0; 1=2] from system XiYj must
incur a transportation/disutility cost of tdXiYj when buying XiYj, where t  0 is a unit
transportation cost. The same consumer must incur transportation cost t(1   dXiYj) when
purchasing any other system (since lXiYj = 1=2 for all i; j = 1; 2). It is assumed that XiYj
is the preferred system for any consumer on lXiYj , and any other system has probability
1=(N   1) = 1=3 of constituting the benchmark against which XiYj is to be compared by
a consumer on lXiYj . A system that is not deemed as preferred or as a benchmark for a
consumer is assumed to yield no utility to such a consumer. This assumption completes the
description of the spokes model we use for modeling the horizontal attributes of systems.8
7See Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-González (2008) for another setting with relationship-specic actions.
8Note that although in the most general version of the spokes model there are N  n systems over which
preferences are dened, we have let N = n for the sake of simplicity. This means that we have assumed that
there is no uncommercialized system that is possibly the object of desire by (some) consumers.
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Given these features of rms and consumers, we study a three-stage game. In the rst
stage, rms Xi (i = 1; 2) simultaneously form pairwise collaboration links with rms Yj
(j = 1; 2). We let gij = 1 if a (costless) collaboration link between Xi and Yj is formed and
gij = 0 otherwise, with the convention that gji = gij. We denote the network (i.e., the set of
collaboration links) by g, that is, g = fg11; g12; g21; g22g 2 f0; 1g4. Note that in principle we
allow a rm to form more than one collaboration link with its complementors (e.g., it may
be possible that gi1 = gi2 = 1 for some i 2 f1; 2g).
In the second stage of the game we consider, we assume that rm Xi chooses x
j
i at
the same time as rm Yj chooses yij (i; j = 1; 2). Given network g and some parameter
 2 (0; 1), investments of x1i and x2i by rmXi result in an R&D cost equal to CXi(x1i ; x2i jg ) =
gi1(x1i )
2 + gi2(x2i )
2, whereas investments of y1j and y
2
j by rm Yj result in an R&D cost
equal to CYj(y
1
j ; y
2
j jg ) = g1j(y1j )2 + g2j(y2j )2.9 Hence, collaboration between rms Xi and
Yj yields that it is easier/cheaper for any of them to enhance the quality of the match with
the component provided by the complementor. This captures in a simple manner useful
but costless information exchanges between rms Xi and Yj with the aim of improving the
interoperability of systemXiYj. For this reason, the inverse of parameter  can be understood
as representing the extent of information sharing and its economic relevance: lowering the
value of  represents in our model more exchange of technically useful information among
collaborators.
In the third and last stage, prices pXi and pYj are set simultaneously in the standard
noncooperative manner, and consumers make their purchase decisions given pij for i; j = 1; 2.
The solution concept is the same as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001). Thus, for
9For example, if g = f1; 0; 0; 0g, then CX1(x11; x21 jg ) = (x11)2 + (x21)2, CX2(x12; x22 jg ) = (x12)2 + (x22)2,
CY1(y
1
1 ; y
2
1 jg ) = (y11)2 + (y21)2 and CY2(y12 ; y22 jg ) = (y12)2 + (y22)2.
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each possible g, we will look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, which will give equilibrium
payo¤s given g. In order to solve for the equilibrium network structure in the rst stage, we
will use the pairwise stability notion proposed by Jackson andWolinsky (1996). This concept
is very weak, and aims at capturing (possibly) complex communication and negotiation
activities that would be hard to capture through noncooperative game theory.
Introducing the concept of pairwise stability requires some notation. In particular, we
let g   gij denote the network that results from suppressing the collaboration link between
rms Xi and Yj in network g. We also let g + gij denote the network that results from
adding a collaboration link between rms Xi and Yj in network g. Denoting the equilibrium
payo¤s obtained by rm Xi and Yj given network g by Xi(g) and 

Yj
(g), network g would
be pairwise stable if the following two conditions held for all i; j 2 f1; 2g: (i) Xi(g) 
Xi(g gij) and Yj(g)  Yj(g gij) for gij = 1 and; (ii) Xi(g+gij)  Xi(g) implies that
Yj(g + gij) < 

Yj
(g). The rst condition requires that neither Xi nor Yj have an incentive
to unilaterally break their collaboration relationship (provided it exists). In turn, the second
condition requires that, if rms Xi and Yj are not linked to each other, then a desire by Xi
to form a collaboration link with Yj should not be reciprocal. It is worth noting that the
results we derive still hold if the network is required to be pairwise Nash stable, that is, if a
rm is allowed to unilaterally break more than one collaboration link at a time.
3 Resolution of the model
3.1 Third stage
As is standard, we solve the last two stages of the game by working backwards. So assume
that rst-stage and second-stage choices lead to a gross valuation of vij for system XiYj,
i; j = 1; 2. We rst derive the demand functions for each system and then we nd out prots
attained by each rm as a function of v11, v12, v21 and v22. It is assumed throughout that v
is large enough so that the market is always fully covered and all rms make positive sales.
If collaboration between rms Xi and Yj drove a system in which none of them participates
out of the market, then there would be an additional incentive to form collaboration links.
It is in this sense that we make the weakest case for collaboration to take place, and still
nd that it emerges in equilibrium.
In order to characterize the demand functions of each system, let lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 = fd :
d 2 lXiYj [ lXi0Yj0g (i; j; i0; j0 = 1; 2, with i 6= i0 or j 6= j0 or both) denote the set consisting of
all the points that belong to either line lXiYj or lXi0Yj0 or both. In dening lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 , we
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establish the convention that i  i0 and j  j0.10 To nd out the demand for system X1Y1,
consider a consumer who happens to be on lX1Y1 + lX1Y2. This occurs either because X1Y1
is her preferred system and X1Y2 is the benchmark, or because X1Y2 is her preferred system
and X1Y1 is the benchmark. The consumer will be indi¤erent between both systems if her
distance d1211 2 [0; 1] from X1Y1 is given by v11   p11   td1211 = v12   p12   t(1  d1211),11 that is,
if
d1211 =
t+ v11   v12 + p12   p11
2t
.
Because the measure of consumers between the locations of systems X1Y1 and X1Y2 is
2=N , we then have that the number of consumers who prefer X1Y1 over X1Y2 given p11 and
p12 is 2d1211=N . Similarly, the number of consumer who prefer X1Y1 over X2Yj (j = 1; 2) can
be shown to be 2d2j11=N , where
d2j11 =
t+ v11   v2j + p2j   p11
2t
.
Conditional uponX1Y1 being the preferred system or the benchmark one, we have thatX1Y2,
X2Y1 and X2Y2 have each probability 1=(N   1) = 1=3 of being the system with respect to
which X1Y1 is to be assessed by consumers. It then follows that demand for X1Y1 is
Q11 =
2(d1211 + d
21
11 + d
22
11)
N(N   1) .
Simple algebra yields that
Q11 =
3t+ 3v11   v12   v21   v22   3p11 + p12 + p21 + p22
12t
.
Similar steps lead to the following demand for system XiYj (i; j = 1; 2):
Qij =
3t+ 3vi;j   v3 i;j   vi;3 j   v3 i;3 j   3pi;j + p3 i;j + pi;3 j + p3 i;3 j
12t
.
Recalling that pi;j = pXi + pYj and letting QXi  Qi1+Qi2 denote Xis demand, we have
that
QXi(pXi ; pX3 i) =
3t+ vi;1 + vi;2   v3 i;1   v3 i;2   2pXi + 2pX3 i
6t
.
We have made the arguments of QXi explicit to highlight that the volume of sales by rm Xi
does not depend on how any complementary product is priced. Under full market coverage,
10Observe from the denition of lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 that i 6= i0 or j 6= j0 or both, so we cannot have both i = i0
and j = j0.
11Recall that the set lX1Y1 + lX1Y2 has unit (Lebesgue) measure.
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di¤erent prices by Y1 and Y2 just a¤ect with which component Xi wishes to be matched, but
rm Xis demand solely depends on pXi and pX3 i. One can similarly nd out that
QYj(pYj ; pY3 j) =
3t+ v1;j + v2;j   v1;3 j   v2;3 j   2pYj + 2pY3 j
6t
,
where QYj  Q1j +Q2j.
Firms X1 and X2 choose pX1 and pX2 to maximize X1(pX1 ; pX2)  pX1QX1(pX1 ; pX2) and
X2(pX2 ; pX1)  pX2QX2(pX2 ; pX1), respectively. Using the strict concavity of prot functions,
we have that the solution to the following system of equations delivers the equilibrium prices
for rms X1 and X2:
3t+ v11 + v12   v21   v22   4pX1 + 2pX2 = 0 (1)
and
3t+ v21 + v22   v11   v12   4pX2 + 2pX1 = 0. (2)
The system consisting of equations (1) and (2) has the following solution:
pXi =
9t+ vi;1 + vi;2   v3 i;1   v3 i;2
6
, i = 1; 2.
Similarly, one can show that
pYj =
9t+ v1;j + v2;j   v1;3 j   v2;3 j
6
, j = 1; 2.
We then have that the sales of system XiYj are
Qij =
9t+ 5vi;j + v3 i;3 j   3vi;3 j   3v3 i;j
36t
.
The prot that systemXiYj generates for rmXi (i; j = 1; 2) is 
j
Xi
 pXiQij, so recalling
that vij = v + x
j
i + y
i
j, we can write it as a function of second-stage choices:
jXi =
1
216t
(9t+ xji + x
3 j
i   xj3 i   x3 j3 i + yij + yi3 j   y3 ij   y3 i3 j)
(9t+ 5xji + x
3 j
3 i   3xj3 i   3x3 ji + 5yij + y3 i3 j   3yi3 j   3y3 ij ).
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Similarly, the prot that system XiYj generates for rm Yj can be written as follows:
iYj =
1
216t
(9t+ xji + x
j
3 i   x3 ji   x3 j3 i + yij + y3 ij   yi3 j   y3 i3 j)
(9t+ 5xji + x
3 j
3 i   3xj3 i   3x3 ji + 5yij + y3 i3 j   3yi3 j   3y3 ij ).
Letting Xi  1Xi + 2Xi and Yj  1Yj + 2Yj respectively denote the overall prots made by
rms Xi and Yj, it is easy to show for i; j = 1; 2 that
Xi =
(9t+ x1i + x
2
i   x13 i   x23 i + yi1 + yi2   y3 i1   y3 i2 )2
108t
,
and
Yj =
(9t+ xj1 + x
j
2   x3 j1   x3 j2 + y1j + y2j   y13 j   y23 j)2
108t
.
The following is worth noting for i; j = 1; 2:
Remark 1 We have that
@2Xi
@xji@x
3 j
i
=
@2Xi
@xji@y
i
j
=
@2Xi
@xji@y
i
3 j
> 0 and
@2Xi
@xji@x
j
3 i
=
@2Xi
@xji@x
3 j
3 i
=
@2Xi
@xji@y
3 i
j
=
@2Xi
@xji@y
3 i
3 j
< 0. Similarly,
@2Yj
@yij@y
3 i
j
=
@2Yj
@yij@x
j
i
=
@2Yj
@yij@x
j
3 i
> 0 and
@2Yj
@yij@y
i
3 j
=
@2Yj
@yij@y
3 i
3 j
=
@2Yj
@yij@x
3 j
i
=
@2Yj
@yij@x
3 j
3 i
< 0.
Remark 1 will be heavily used in what follows, so it is worthwhile expressing in words
what it means. Essentially, a rms incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with
any one of its complementors becomes less intense as there is less investment in any of the
systems in which the rm participates. This incentive is also weakened as there is more
investment in any of the systems in which it does not participate.
3.2 Second and rst stages
We now consider the investment subgames for each of the possible network structures arising
from the rst stage. Up to a relabeling of rms, there are six network structures that
should be considered (see Figure 2): g1  f0; 0; 0; 0g, g2  f1; 0; 0; 0g, g3  f1; 0; 0; 1g,
g4  f1; 1; 0; 0g, g5  f1; 1; 0; 1g and g6  f1; 1; 1; 1g. Besides characterizing equilibrium
play for each, we also show which one emerges as the unique (pairwise) stable network, thus
e¤ectively providing a complete resolution of the network formation game.
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We start by analyzing networks structures when no rm can have more than one collabo-
ration link (i.e., g = g1, or g = g2, or g = g3), which may be due to exclusivity, for instance.12
We then consider network architectures when rms can have more than one collaboration
tie (i.e., g = g4, or g = g5, or g = g6). At this point, it is useful to dene the following
functions:
Xi(x
1
i ; x
2
i ; x
1
3 i; x
2
3 i; y
1
j ; y
2
j ; y
1
3 j; y
2
3 j jg )  Xi   CXi(x1i ; x2i jg )
and
Yj(y
1
j ; y
2
j ; y
1
3 j; y
2
3 j; x
1
i ; x
2
i ; x
1
3 i; x
2
3 i jg )  Yj   CYj(y1j ; y2j jg ).
Given network architecture g, we then have that rm Xi (i = 1; 2) chooses x1i  0 and x2i  0
to maximize Xi, while rm Yj (j = 1; 2) chooses y
1
j  0 and y2j  0 to maximize Yj , where
we have suppressed the arguments of the functions to avoid clutter. We also recall that all
second-stage choices are made simultaneously. Lastly, we note that we will avoid equilibrium
inexistence by making t large enough.13
3.2.1 Network structures under exclusivity
We rst consider network g = g1  f0; 0; 0; 0g. Assuming that t > 1=54 to ensure that
payo¤ functions are strictly concave, we have that the unique equilibrium is symmetric, and
12The formation of exclusive collaboration links may be due to explicit or implicit contracting requirements,
or to highly competitive conditions that preclude several complementors from being willing to collaborate
with the same rm.
13The inexistence problem is already present in Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebu¤ and Yo¢ e (2008), who get
around it by introducing vertical di¤erentiation.
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it is characterized by each rm investing xji (g
1) = yij(g
1) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2) in trying to
(unilaterally) improve the match with each complementary component. Equilibrium prots
for each rm under g = g1 are
Xi(g
1) = Yj(g
1) =
54t  1
72
,
which are positive for t > 1=54.
We now turn to the case in which there is just one collaboration link, i.e., g = g2 
f1; 0; 0; 0g. If one makes the assumption for g = g2 that t > 1=(27) to ensure that pay-
o¤ functions are strictly concave and investment levels are positive, it holds that the unique
equilibrium is characterized by the following investments in match quality: x11(g
2) = y11(g
2) =
27t  1
6(54t   1  ) , x
2
1(g
2) = y21(g
2) =
 (27t  1)
6(54t   1  ) and x
1
2(g
2) = x22(g
2) = y12(g
2) =
y22(g
2) =
27t   1
6(54t   1  ) . Equilibrium prots under g = g
2 are then
X1(g
2) = Y1(g
2) =
(108t   1  )(27t  1)2
36(54t   1  )2
and
X2(g
2) = Y2(g
2) =
(54t  1)(27t   1)2
18(54t   1  )2 .
All prots are positive for t > 1=(27), as can be easily demonstrated. It can also be
shown that this parametric assumption ensures that equilibrium quantities of each system
are positive, as required by the full market coverage assumption we have made. We are now
in a position to prove the following result.
Lemma 2 Network g = g1 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 1=(27).
Proof. Noting that g2 = g1 + g11, it holds that X1(g
2) = Y1(g
2) > Y1(g
1) = X1(g
1)
for t > 1=(27), and rms X1 and Y1 would mutually benet from forming a link with each
other, so g = g1 cannot be a stable network.
The result follows because both rms X1 and Y1 would benet from forming a collabo-
ration tie if the network were g = g1. To understand why this happens, note that, relative
to the case in which g = g1, there arise several incentives for rms X1 and Y1 if g = g2. On
the one hand, the investment cost sinergy leads them to increase x11 and y
1
1, which in turn
creates pressure towards increasing x21 and y
2
1 in the light of Remark 1. On the other, the
negative impact of higher x21 on rm X2s marginal payo¤ is completely o¤set by the positive
impact of higher y21. Taking this into consideration as well as the fact that system X1Y1
12
is stronger, it then holds that rm X2 prefers to lower x12 in such a way that x
1
2 + y
2
1 does
not vary with respect to the level under g = g1. In an analogous fashion, total investment
in system X1Y2 does not vary because rm Y2 lowers y12 in way that o¤sets the increase in
x21. The strength of systems X1Y2 and X2Y1 is then una¤ected, but rms X2 and Y2 end up
respectively decreasing x22 and y
2
2 because system X1Y1 becomes stronger. Interestingly, rm
X2 reduces x12 and x
2
2 by the same amount (and analogously for rm Y2 with e
1
2 and e
2
2). The
reason why this happens is that rm X2 equally benets from investing in the match with
Y1 or Y2, so we must have that both x12 and x
2
2 are reduced by the same amount because
the strict convexity of R&D costs implies that it is more e¢ cient to spread e¤ort over two
complementors rather than just one.
In short, g1 is not a stable network because rms X1 and Y1 would mutually benet from
forming a link. This incentive to form a link arises because of the cost synergy that is fostered
by their collaboration and the positive strategic e¤ect of such collaboration.14 Despite rms
X1 and Y1 benet from the fact that rms X2 and Y2 reduce their investment in each other,
rms X2 and Y2 exploit the incentive that rms X1 and Y1 have to invest more in systems
X1Y2 and X2Y1 by cutting down their respective investments in such systems, which harms
X1 and Y1 a bit. Overall, the strategic reaction of rms X2 and Y2 benets rms X1 and Y1,
thus reinforcing the positive direct e¤ect of cost sinergies exploited by X1 and Y1.
We conclude this subsection by analyzing what happens if each rm has one, and only one,
collaboration link, i.e., g = g3  f1; 0; 0; 1g. Under the assumption that t > (1 + )=(108),
all payo¤ functions are strictly concave, and the unique equilibrium is symmetric, being
characterized by the following investments in match quality: x11(g
3) = x22(g
3) = y11(g
3) =
y22(g
3) = 1=12 and x21(g
3) = x12(g
3) = y21(g
3) = y12(g
3) = 1=12. Equilibrium prots under
g = g3 are
Xi(g
3) = Yj(g
3) =
108t   1  
144
,
which are positive for t > (1 + )=(108). This parametric assumption also yields that
quantity sold of each system is positive in equilibrium. We then have all the elements to rule
out g = g2 as an equilibrium outcome.
14We compute the direct (prot) e¤ect of collaboration between rms X1 and Y1 through the following
thought experiment. Upon collaborating, both of these rms react to the change in their investment costs
taking into account the reactions of each other in an optimal manner, but keeping the investments of rms
X2 and Y2 as in g = g1 (i.e., X2 and Y2 do not react to the change in the network architecture). This
yields some prot for rms X1 and Y1, which after respectively subtracting X1(g
1) and Y1(g
1), gives the
direct e¤ect of collaboration for each of them. The di¤erence between X1(g
2)   X1(g1) and the direct
e¤ect for rm X1 then gives the strategic (prot) e¤ect of collaboration for this rm, that is, how its prots
change because of the reaction of rms X2 and Y2 to collaboration between X1 and Y1. One can compute
the strategic (prot) e¤ect of collaboration for rm Y1 in an analogous manner.
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Lemma 3 Network g = g2 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > (1 + )=(108).
Proof. Noting that g3 = g2 + g22, it holds that X2(g
3) = Y2(g
3) > Y2(g
2) = X2(g
2) for
t > (1 + )=(108), and rms X2 and Y2 would mutually benet from forming a link with
each other, so g = g2 cannot be a stable network.
Starting from g = g2, let us consider the incentive for rms X2 and Y2 to form a tie, an
incentive that is somewhat similar to the one that rms X1 and Y1 to form a link starting
from g = g1. Of course, the sinergistic e¤ect of collaboration leads to higher x22 and y
2
2. In
the light of Remark 1, though, the increases in x22 and y
2
2 also create an incentive for rms
X2 and Y2 to respectively increase x12 and y
1
2. The higher x
1
2 has a negative impact on rm
X1s marginal payo¤, whereas the higher y12 has a positive impact on rm X1s marginal
payo¤ (by Remark 1). Taking into account that both of these e¤ects cancel out and that
system X2Y2 is stronger, it follows from Remark 1 that rm X1 prefers to lower x21, and it
does it in such a way that x21+ y
1
2 remains unchanged with respect to the level under g = g
2.
Similarly, total investment x12+y
2
1 in system X2Y1 does not vary because rm Y1 lowers y
2
1 so
as to o¤set the increase in x12. Even though systems X2Y1 and X1Y2 are neither strengthened
nor weakened, the fact that system X2Y2 is stronger induces rms X1 and Y1 to respectively
decrease x11 and y
1
1. Again, collaboration by rms X2 and Y2 results in a positive strategic
e¤ect that reinforces the cost sinergies that arise because of their collaboration, and hence
X2 and Y2 mutually benet from forming a link with each other.
In the light of Lemmata 2-3, it is clear that the unique stable network that arises when
collaboration is exclusive is g = g3. However, each rm would be better o¤ if collaboration
were forbidden or impossible. Gross prots are the same under g = g1 and g = g3 because
rms do not change their pricing and end up selling the same (of course, systems X1Y1
and X2Y2 are bought more under g = g3, but this is at the expense of X1Y2 and X2Y1).
However, total investment costs are greater under g = g3 than under g = g1 (more precisely,
(1 + )=(144) vs. 1=72), which explains why a rms payo¤ decreases when going from
g = g1 to g = g3. Firms are worse o¤, but consumers are much better o¤ under g = g3 than
under g = g1, and as a result social welfare increases when going from g = g1 to g = g3. In
particular, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Let t > 1=(27) and suppose that collaborating with a complementor pre-
cludes a rm from collaborating with the complementors competitor. Then:
(i) The unique (up to a relabeling of rms) equilibrium network is g = f1; 0; 0; 1g.
(ii) In equilibrium, rm X1 chooses to invest x11(g
) = 1=(12) in improving the quality
of its match with complementor Y1, whereas it chooses to invest x21(g
) = 1=12 in improving
the quality of its match with complementor Y2. In turn, rm Y1 chooses to invest y11(g
) =
14
1=(12) in improving the quality of its match with complementor X1, whereas it chooses
to invest y21(g
) = 1=12 in improving the quality of its match with complementor X2. In
addition, each rm earns a payo¤ of (108t   1  )=(144).
(iii) The equilibrium network g = f1; 0; 0; 1g results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller
than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g, even though g = f1; 0; 0; 1g is socially preferred
over g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. Both for g = g1 and g = g3, it holds that pX1 = p

X2
= pY1 = p

Y2
= 3t=2, so
p11 = p

12 = p

21 = p

21 = 3t. In addition, the number of consumers purchasing system
XiYj (i; j = 1; 2) under g = g1 is Qij(g
1) = 1=4. However, the number of consumers
purchasing systems X1Y1 and X2Y2 under g = g3 is Q11(g
3) = Q22(g
3) =
1
4
+
1  
36t
, whereas
the number of consumers purchasing systems X1Y2 and X2Y1 under g = g3 is Q12(g
3) =
Q21(g
3) =
1
4
  1  
36t
. Taking into account that line lXiYj (i; j = 1; 2) has a length of 1=2 and
that that there exists a unit mass of consumers uniformly spread all over the four existing
lines, the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g1 is
CS(g1) = 4
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1
2
0
zdz
!#
,
while the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g3 is
CS(g3) = 2
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1
2
+ 1 
18t
0
zdz
!#
+
2
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1
2
  1 
18t
0
zdz
!#
.
Because 54t > 27t > 1 >  implies that
CS(g3)  CS(g1) = (1  )(54t +    1)
324t2
> 0
and
2X
i=1
[Xi(g
3)  Xi(g1)] +
2X
j=1
[Yj(g
3)  Yj(g1)] =  
1  
36
< 0,
it follows from the fact that 45t > 27t > 1 that social surplus increases by
(1  )(45t +    1)
324t2
>
0 when going from g = g1 to g = g3 despite rms are worse o¤ than when collaboration is
forbidden or impossible.
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Given that the social welfare comparison is entirely driven by the increase in consumer
surplus, it is worthwhile explaining why it happens. Note rst that, under g = g3, the
investment in enhancing the match quality with a complementor with which a rm does not
collaborate is exactly the same as under g = g1. However, the investment in enhancing the
match quality with a complementor with which a rm does collaborate increases relative to
network g = g1. Taking into account that component prices are the same under g = g1 and
g = g3, it follows that some systems are more appealing in their vertical attributes when
g = g3, and hence are bought more than when g = g1. However, no consumer is worse o¤
under g = g3 than under g = g1. Those consumers who were already consuming one of
the enhanced systems are obviously better o¤ given the enhancements. In turn, those new
consumers attracted by any of the enhanced systems experience a greater transportation
cost, but still prefer purchasing one of the enhanced systems. This revealed preference
argument shows that these consumers achieve a greater utility under g = g3 than under
g = g1. Finally, those consumers who were already consuming one of the systems whose
quality is not enhanced make the same utility under g = g3 than g = g1 given that prices
and total investments in these systems do not change.
3.2.2 Network structures under non-exclusivity
We now deal with network structures in which at least one rm has more than one collabo-
ration link. As with the previously considered network structures, in equilibrium, rms try
to collaborate with as many complementors as it is possible, which will rule out g = g3 as
a plausible equilibrium outcome. The underlying economic forces are quite similar to those
behind Proposition 4, and it holds that collaboration between two rms involves positive
direct and strategic e¤ects. Thus, start from a network architecture in which rms Xi and
Yj are not linked and let us consider what happens if these rms begin collaborating with
each other. The cost sinergies that arise from collaboration between such rms result in
higher xji and y
i
j. In turn, x
3 j
i and y
3 i
j also augment (by Remark 1). The negative e¤ect
of x3 ji on rm X3 is marginal payo¤ is o¤set by the positive e¤ect of y
3 i
j , so the fact that
XiYj becomes stronger leads rm X3 i to reduce x
j
3 i in such a way that x
j
3 i + y
3 i
j does
not change. Similarly, yi3 j is reduced by rm Y3 j in such a way that x
3 j
i + y
i
3 j remains
invariant, so neither system XiY3 j nor system X3 iYj become weaker or stronger. The fact
that system XiYj is strengthened then implies that x
3 j
3 i and y
3 1
3 j are reduced. The outcome
of these economic forces leads to the following result.
Proposition 5 Let t > bt  (3  2 +p42   6 + 3)=(54) and suppose that collaborating
with a complementor does not preclude a rm from collaborating with the complementors
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competitor. Then:
(i) The unique equilibrium network structure is the complete network, namely g =
f1; 1; 1; 1g.
(ii) In equilibrium, rm Xi chooses to invest x
j
i (g
) = 1=(12) in improving the quality
of its match with complementor Yj, whereas rm Yj chooses to invest yij(g
) = 1=(12) in
improving the quality of its match with complementor Xi (i; j = 1; 2). In addition, each rm
earns a payo¤ of (54t   1)=(72).
(iii) The equilibrium network g = f1; 1; 1; 1g results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller
than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g, even though g = f1; 1; 1; 1g is socially preferred
over g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. We start by noting that neither g = g1 nor g = g2 can arise as stable networks in
the light of Proposition 4. We proceed to show that neither g = g3 nor g = g4 nor g = g5
can arise as equilibrium network congurations, which requires that we compute payo¤s for
each of them (note that this has already been done for g = g3).
So we rst compute equilibrium payo¤s under g = g4  f1; 1; 0; 0g under the assumption
that t > (3  ) =(54) so as to ensure the strict concavity of payo¤s and the non-negativity
of equilibrium prots, investment levels and quantities sold. Then we have that x11(g
4) =
x21(g
4) =
54t + 1  3
12(54t   1  ) , x
1
2(g
4) = x22(g
4) =
54t   3 + 
12(54t   1  ) , y
2
1(g
4) = y22(g
4) =
1
12
and y11(g
4) = y12(g
4) =
1
12
. As for equilibrium prots for g = g4, they are
X1(g
4) =
(54t   1) (54t + 1  3)2
72(54t   1  )2 ,
X2(g
4) =
(54t   1) (54t   3 + )2
72(54t   1  )2
and
Yj(g
4) =
108t   1  
144
, j = 1; 2.
We analyze now the cases in which g = g5  f1; 1; 0; 1g under the assumption that
t > bt  (3   2 +p42   6 + 3)=(54), which guarantees that payo¤s are strictly con-
cave and that equilibrium prots, investment levels and quantities sold are all non-negative.
Solving for an equilibrium then yields x11(g
5) = x21(g
5) = y12(g
5) = y22(g
5) =
27t  1
6(54t   1  ) ,
x12(g
5) = y21(g
5) =
27t   1
6(54t   1  ) , and x
2
2(g
5) = y11(g
5) =
27t   1
6(54t   1  ) . As for prots
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in equilibrium under g = g5, they are
X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) =
(54t   1)(27t  1)2
18(54t   1  )2
and
X2(g
5) = Y1(g
5) =
(108t   1  )(27t   1)2
36(54t   1  )2 .
Noting that g5 = g3+g12, it holds that X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) > Y2(g
3) = X1(g
3) for t > bt,
and we have that rmsX1 and Y2 would mutually benet from forming a link with each other,
so g = g3 cannot be a stable network. Network g = g4 can also be discarded as an equilibrium
outcome. To show this, note that g5 = g4 + g22, so the fact that X2(g
5) > X2(g
4) and
Y2(g
5) > Y2(g
4) for t > bt implies that rms X2 and Y2 would mutually benet from
forming a link with each other.
We deal now with the nal network that needs to be considered, namely g = g6 
f1; 1; 1; 1g. Under the assumption that t > 1=(54) (which ensures payo¤ concavity and
non-negativity of the relevant variables), the unique equilibrium is symmetric and involves
the following investment levels: xji (g
6) = yij(g
6) = 1=(12) (i; j = 1; 2). Equilibrium prots
under g = g6 are
Xi(g
6) = Yj(g
6) =
54t   1
72
,
which are positive for t > 1=(54).
Using these prots, we can rule out g = g5 as an equilibrium network. Noting that
g6 = g5 + g21, it holds that X2(g
6) > X2(g
5) and Y1(g
6) > Y1(g
5) for t > bt. It then
follows that rms X2 and Y1 would mutually benet from forming a link with each other,
and hence g = g5 cannot be a stable network.
The fact that Xi(g
6) > Xi(g
5) for i = 1; 2 and Yj(g
6) > Yj(g
5) for j = 1; 2 implies
that g = g6 is indeed an equilibrium network for t > bt, which proves parts (i) and (ii).
In order to examine the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium network in the absence
of exclusivity constraints and thus prove (iii), note that it holds both for g = g1 and g = g6
that pX1 = p

X2
= pY1 = p

Y2
= 3t=2, so p11 = p

12 = p

21 = p

21 = 3t and Q

ij = 1=4 for
i; j = 1; 2. Therefore, the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g1 is
CS(g1) = 4
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1
2
0
zdz
!#
,
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while the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g6 is
CS(g6) = 4
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1
2
0
zdz
!#
.
It then holds that
CS(g6)  CS(g1) = (1  )=(3) > 0.
Because
2X
i=1
[Xi(g
6)  Xi(g1)] +
2X
j=1
[Yj(g
6)  Yj(g1)] =  
1  
18
< 0,
we have that social welfare increases by 5(1 )=(18) > 0 when going from g = g1 to g = g6
despite rms are worse o¤ than when collaboration is forbidden or impossible.
Hence, collaboration cannot improve upon the case in which each rm acts uncoordi-
natedly. In equilibrium, rms engage in a futile ght to vertically di¤erentiate the systems
in which they participate by collaborating with as many complementors as possible and by
boosting investments accordingly. The larger investments result in an increase in invest-
ment costs, and the greater investment costs end up being just a wasteful rent dissipation,
since nothing is gained in return despite the (possibly substantial) downward shift in cost
functions.15 All consumers greatly benet from the greater functionality of every existing
system, though. This explains why society would be worse o¤without collaborative activities
involving information sharing among complementors.
When all rms simultaneously start collaborating with their complementors, the greater
investments of each complementor in the systems in which it participates do not a¤ect a
rms prot because these e¤ects cancel out. So the existence of complementors is irrelevant
for the result that rms prefer the empty network over the complete one. In particular,
an envelope argument shows the result is simply driven by the positive direct e¤ect on a
rms prot of having lower investment costs and the negative strategic e¤ect of having the
competitor invest more in all the systems in which it participates. The latter e¤ect dominates
the former for any admissible value of  < 1, which explains why any rm is better o¤ when
no collaboration at all takes place. In addition, the strategic e¤ect becomes more important
than the direct e¤ect as  decreases. As a result, a rms preference for the empty network
over the complete one is accentuated as  is lowered, that is, as information sharing among
complementors makes it cheaper to enhance the quality of the match with a complementor.
15Thus, if rms invested as much as under g = g1, their prots would indeed augment because the cost
function shifts downwards. But precisely this downward shift in the cost function of a rm leads all of them
to futilely invest more, thus dissipating the potential gains from the cost function shift.
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Also, using Propositions 4 and 5 yields that rms are better o¤ under exclusivity than under
non-exclusivity.
Proposition 6 Let t > bt  (3   2 + p42   6 + 3)=(54). Then equilibrium payo¤s
decrease as  decreases. Furthermore, the equilibrium network under formation of non-
exclusive collaboration ties results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller than that achieved under
exclusive collaboration ties.
4 Robustness of the results
4.1 Stronger equilibrium concepts
We recall that we have used the notion of pairwise stability as our solution concept for the
strategic network formation game under consideration. In the context of our game, the main
drawback of this solution concept has to do with the possibility that a rm with several links
may want to sever more than one link at a time.16 However, this criticism does not apply to
the game just analyzed. Indeed, the fact that X2(g
6) > X2(g
4) implies that the complete
network is stable even if the pairwise stability solution concept is augmented to allow for the
deletion of several links at a time (the complete network is then said to be pairwise Nash
stable).
4.2 Collaboration fostering partly cooperative investments
The result that collaboration is ine¢ cient from the viewpoints of rms also holds if free-
riding by a rm on a complementors investment e¤ort is partly mitigated if both rms
being collaborating. To this end, let  = 1 and suppose that gij = 1 implies now that
both rms Xi and Yj care in some sense about each others payo¤ when making investment
choices.17 Specically, given network architecture g and some parameter  2 (0; 1), suppose
that rm Xi (i = 1; 2) chooses in the second stage x1i  0 and x2i  0 to maximize either
Xi   (x1i )2   (x2i )2 + 
2X
j=1
gij[

Yj
  (y1j )2   (y2j )2]
16See Jackson (2008, pp. 156 and 371-376) for a thorough discussion of the virtues and limitations of
pairwise stability as a solution concept.
17There are many formal or informal arrangements that may lead two complementors that collaborate
with each other to make their investments in improving their match quality in a (somewhat) cooperative
manner. Reasons range from research alliances (or collusive R&D cartels) to relational capital concerns in
ongoing relationships between rms that need each other to some extent because of their complementarity.
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or
Xi   (x1i )2   (x2i )2 + 
2X
j=1
gij[
i
Yj
  (yij)2],
and similarly for rm Yj (j = 1; 2). Suppose also that, except in the second stage, rms solely
pay attention to their own payo¤s when making decisions of whether to form a collaboration
tie or which price to set. It can be shown in these cases that our results go through, with
the exception that the equilibrium networks are not only ine¢ cient for the rms but also for
consumers (and hence society).18 In the absence of pecuniary e¤ects of collaboration, one
may then expect ine¢ ciencies to arise both at the rm and the social levels. Collaboration
with pecuniary e¤ects resolves the social ine¢ ciences but not the private ones, which remain,
as Propositions 4 and 5 show.
5 Conclusion
The locus of strategic interaction in many high-tech industries has broadened from the
traditional competitive approach based on value capture towards one in which cooperative
aspects with regards to value creation also play a critical role, as Brandenburger and Nalebu¤
(1996) emphasize. Not surprisingly, such "co-opetitive" settings display rich innovation
ecosystems in which complementors collaborate with each other in R&D actitivities. This
paper has shown that such rich innovation ecosystems may be an equilibrium phenomenon
with disturbing properties for their members. In particular, we have shown that they may be
an ine¢ cient outcome for competing rms that can collaborate with complementors. They
may also be ine¢ cient for society. These results hold under a variety of scenarios (e.g.,
regardless of whether or not collaboration exhibits exclusive features).
In this paper, we have abstracted away from dynamics to clarify our points, but there are
many issues that have to do with dynamic variables. For example, collaboration may refer
to the timing at which complementary products are brought to the market. Exploring this
kind of issues seems promising enough to warrant further work on this completely unexplored
area.
18See Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda (2011) for a full analysis of these situations, both under exclusivity and
the lack thereof.
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